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The UN’s Refugee Convention is increasingly marginal to the way in which refugee protection happens around
the world.  I believe that this is a bad thing—both for refugees and for states.
When introducing the draft of the Refugee Convention some 65 years ago, the UN’s first Secretary General
explained that “[t]his phase… will be characterized by the fact that the refugees will lead an independent life in
the countries which have given them shelter. With the exception of the ‘hard core’ cases, the refugees will no
longer be maintained by an international organization as they are at present. They will be integrated in the
economic system of the countries of asylum and will themselves provide for their own needs and for those of
their families.”
Yet today, and despite the fact that 148 countries have signed onto the Refugee Convention, the reality is quite
the opposite. Most refugees today are not allowed to live independent lives. Most refugees are maintained by an
international organization. And most refugees are emphatically not allowed to provide for their own needs.
Most refugees today do not enjoy the freedom of movement to which they are entitled under international law. In
an especially cruel irony, the UN’s refugee agency—the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)—runs more refugee camps than anyone else. Not only is this response unlawful, it is absurdly
counter-productive. Refugees become burdens on their hosts and the international community, and they are
debilitated in ways that often make it difficult for them ever to return home, integrate locally or resettle. The risk
of violence in refugee camps is also endemic—with women and children especially vulnerable to the anger that
too often arises from being caged up.
What went wrong?
One thing that is not wrong is the Refugee Convention itself. Its definition of a refugee (“a well-founded fear of
being persecuted” for discriminatory reasons) has proved wonderfully flexible, identifying new groups of
fundamentally disfranchised persons unable to benefit from human rights protection in their own countries.
At least as important, its catalog of refugee-specific rights remains as valuable today as ever. The underlying
theory of the Refugee Convention is emphatically not the creation of dependency by hand-outs. It guarantees
the social and economic rights that refugees need to be able to get back on their feet after being forced away
from their own national community—for example, to access education, to seek work and to start businesses. And
as was patently obvious to the states that drafted the refugee treaty, refugees could not begin to look after
themselves, much less to contribute to the well-being of their host communities, if they were caged up.
For this reason, as soon as a refugee has submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the host country, satisfied
authorities of her identity and addressed any security-related concerns, the Refugee Convention requires that
she be afforded not only freedom of movement, but the right to choose her place of residence—a right that
continues until and unless the substance of her refugee claim is negatively determined. Indeed, a recent study
shows that those countries that do facilitate refugee freedom of movement are often economically advantaged
by the presence of refugees.
Why, then, are so many refugees subject to constraints on freedom of movement? Part of the reason is that
setting up refugee camps is an easy “one size fits all” answer that can be quickly and efficiently rolled out by both
the UNHCR and many of its humanitarian partners. When there is a political imperative to act, the establishment
of camps is a concrete and visible sign of engagement. Indeed, even as the rest of the world largely ignored the
regional states receiving most Syrian refugees, international donors stepped forward to finance the building and
operation of refugee camps.
Most fundamentally, though, denying mobility rights to refugees is a strategy that appeals to states that would
prefer to avoid their international duty to protect refugees. While not willing to accept the political cost of formally
renouncing the treaty, states with the economic and practical wherewithal have for many years sought to ensure
that refugees never arrive at their jurisdiction, at which point duties inhere. Deterrent practices have, however,
been increasingly and successfully challenged in courts. Of course, poorer states, as well as those with
especially porous borders, have rarely been able to deter refugee arrivals at all. In this context, refugee detention
—often accompanied by other harsh treatment post-arrival—is seen as a second-best means for a state to
“send a signal” that they are not open to the arrival of refugees.
But why are states so often unwilling to receive refugees? Safety and security are of course frequently invoked.
While such concerns can be real, there is no empirical evidence that refugees present a greater threat of crime
or violence than do the many other non-citizens routinely crossing borders, or indeed those already resident in
the state—including citizens. In any event, the Refugee Convention takes a very hard line on such cases,
requiring the exclusion from refugee status of any person reasonably suspected of being a criminal, and allowing
states to send away those shown to pose a threat to their safety or security—even back to the country of
persecution if there is no other option.
The real concern is instead that most governments believe that refugees who arrive at their borders impose
unconditional and indefinite obligations on them—and on them alone. The idea that the arrival of refugees can
effectively subvert a state’s sovereign authority over immigration is understandably unsettling to even powerful
states. For states of the less developed world, which receive more than 80% of the world’s refugees, the
challenge can be acute. They are supported by no more than the (often grossly inadequate and inevitably
fluctuating) charity of wealthier countries, and rarely benefit from meaningful support to lessen the human
responsibility of protection. Of the roughly 14 million refugees in the world last year, only about 100,000 were
resettled—with just two countries, the United States and Canada, providing the lion’s share of this woefully
inadequate contribution.
The challenge, then, is to ensure that refugees can access meaningful protection in a way that both addresses
the legitimate concerns of states and which harnesses the refugees’ own ability to contribute to the viability of the
protection regime.
The irony is that the Refugee Convention itself suggests the way forward. It rejects a charity-based model in
favor of refugee empowerment. It is massively attentive to the safety and security concerns of states. It does not
require the permanent admission of refugees, but only their protection for the duration of the risk in their home
country. And perhaps most important, the refugee regime was never intended to operate in the atomized and
uncoordinated way that has characterized most of its nearly 65-year history. To the contrary, the Preamble to the
Refugee Convention expressly recognizes that “the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain
countries”, such that real global protection “cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation.”
 This is not just another tired call for states to live up to what they have signed onto. It is rather a plea for us
fundamentally to change the way that refugee law is implemented. The obligations are right, but the mechanisms
for implementing those obligations are flawed in ways that too often lead states to act against their own values
and interests—and which produce needless suffering amongst refugees.
 How should we proceed?
A team of lawyers, social scientists, non-governmental activists, and governmental and intergovernmental
officials, drawn from all parts of the world, worked for five years to conceive the model for a new approach to
implementing the Refugee Convention. We reached consensus on a number of core principles.
1. Reform must address the circumstances of all states, not just the powerful
few.
Most refugee “reform” efforts in recent years have been designed and controlled by powerful states—for
example, Australia and the EU. There has been no effort to share out fairly in a binding way the much greater
burdens and responsibilities of the less developed world, even at the level of financial contributions or
guaranteed resettlement opportunities. This condemns poorer states and the 80% of refugees who live in them
to mercurial and normally inadequate support—leading often to failure to respect refugee rights. It is also
decidedly short-sighted in that the absence of meaningful protection options nearer to home is a significant
driver of efforts to find extra-regional asylum, often playing into the strategies of smugglers and traffickers.
2. Plan for, rather than simply react to, refugee movements.
The international refugee system should commit itself to pre-determined burden (financial) sharing and
responsibility (human) sharing quotas. Such factors as prior contributions to refugee protection, per capita GDP,
and arable land provide sensible starting points for the allocation of shares of the financial and human
dimensions of protection. But, as the recent abortive effort to come up with such shares ex post by the European
Union makes clear, the insurance-based logic of standing allocations can only be accomplished in advance of
any particular refugee movement.
3. Embrace common but differentiated state responsibility.
There need be no necessary connection between the place where a refugee arrives and the state in which
protection for duration of risk will occur, thus undercutting the logic of disguised economic migration via the
refugee procedure. And rather than asking all states to take on the same protection roles, we should harness the
ability and willingness of different states to assist in different ways. The core of the renewed protection regime
should be common but differentiated responsibility, meaning that beyond the common duty to provide first
asylum, states could assume a range of protection roles within their responsibility-sharing quota (protection for
duration of risk; exceptional immediate permanent integration; residual resettlement)—though all states would be
required to make contributions to both (financial) burden-sharing and (human) responsibility-sharing, with no
trade-offs between the two.
4. Shift away from national, and towards international, administration of refugee
protection.
We advocate a revitalized UNHCR to administer quotas, with authority to allocate funds and refugees based on
respect for legal norms; and encouragement of a shift to common international refugee status determination
system and group prima facie assessment to reduce processing costs, thereby freeing up funds for real and
dependable support to front-line receiving countries—including start-up funds for economic development that
links refugees to their host communities, and which facilitate their eventual return home. Our economists
suggest that reallocation of the funds now spent on domestic asylum systems would more than suffice to fund
this system. And since as described below positive refugee status recognition would have no domestic
immigration consequence for the state in which status assessment occurs, this savings could be realized without
engaging sovereignty concerns.
5. Protection for duration of risk, not necessarily permanent immigration.
We should be clear that this is a system for which migration is the means to protection, not an end in and
of itself. Managed entry regimes should be promoted where feasible, though the right of refugees to arrive
wherever they can reach without penalization for unlawful presence must be respected (thus undercutting the
market for smugglers and traffickers). Some refugees—such as unaccompanied minors and victims of severe
trauma—will require immediate permanent integration, though others should instead be granted rights-regarding
protection for duration of risk. Creative development assistance linking refugees to host communities would
increase the prospects for local integration, and many refugees will eventually feel able to return home. But for
those still without access to either of these solutions at 5-7 years after arrival, residual resettlement would
be guaranteed to those still at risk, enabling them to remake their lives with a guarantee of durable rights—in
stark contrast to the present norm of often indefinite uncertainty.
If we are serious about avoiding continuing humanitarian tragedy—not just in Europe but throughout the world—
then the present atomized and haphazard approach to refugee protection must end. The moment has come not
to renegotiate the Refugee Convention, but rather at long last to operationalize that treaty in a way that works
dependably, and fairly.
This article has previously been published on Open Global Rights and is republished here with kind permission
by the author.
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